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INTRODUCTION 
In asserting that law is a profession and not a business, lawyers 
often refer to the role self-governance plays in the legal profession.  
Julius Henry Cohen captured this sentiment in making the following 
exhortation: “Ours is a profession . . . .  We are all in a boat.  The sins 
of one of us are the sins of all of us.  Come, gentlemen, let us clean 
house.”1  As members of a profession, Cohen asserts that lawyers may 
be brought to prompt and summary accountability through a 
collective enterprise.2 
 
* Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics, Maurice A. Deane 
School of Law at Hofstra University.  I thank the members of the Fordham Urban 
Law Journal, Professors Bruce Green, Sam Levine, and Russ Pearce for inviting me 
to participate in the conference The Law: Business or Profession?  Thanks also to 
Professors Monroe Freedman, Stephen Gillers, and Joan Loughrey for their 
comments.  Finally, thanks to my research assistants, Steven Hollander and Chris 
Leo. 
 1. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW, BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 109 (1924) 
(referring to the “germ of the American guild-idea”). 
 2. Id. at 22–23 (asserting that one destroys the basis of professional discipline if 
one makes the law a business). 
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When Cohen and other bar leaders speak of accountability, their 
focus is often on the role that professional discipline plays in 
protecting the public.  A similar concern relates to protecting the 
public by limiting law practice to attorneys who complete a course of 
education and demonstrate the requisite character befitting a member 
of the bar.3 
In his essays, Cohen recognizes the disparate positions of lawyers 
and their clients.  For example, he notes that clients may not have the 
background or expertise to make informed judgments in retaining a 
lawyer.4  Because lawyers stand in a position of trust and confidence, 
Cohen advocates limiting law practice to persons who possess 
“adequate learning and purity of character.”5  This approach to public 
protection targets the qualities of those who enter the door of the 
profession.  Once admitted, the focus turns to policing those 
practitioners whose conduct runs afoul of the minimum standards to 
avoid professional discipline.6  Far less attention is devoted to 
considering accountability of lawyers who depart from standards of 
care applicable in professional liability cases. 
This Article will address this gap by examining accountability in 
the context of professional liability.  To do so, it will consider select 
developments that required lawyers, the organized bar, legislators, 
and jurists to balance lawyer self-interest and public protection.  
Specifically, this Article will consider lawyers’ collective campaign to 
limit their vicarious liability, as well as developments related to 
lawyers carrying legal malpractice insurance.  An examination of 
legislation and regulatory decisions related to lawyers’ professional 
liability over the last two decades reveals that accountability concerns 
may not have been adequately considered because of the absence of 
advocacy on behalf of consumers and the public.  For lawyers and law 
professors committed to advancing the status of law as a profession, 
this Article ends by urging them to take steps to promote financial 
responsibility as a basic tenet of professionalism and to support 
initiatives that protect consumers injured by lawyers’ professional 
misconduct. 
 
 3. See generally id. at 125–41 (calling for more demanding educational 
requirements for lawyers).  The chapter ends by noting that “Education for the Bar 
must include moral training—if it is to be education for the Bar.” Id. at 141. 
 4. Id. at 288.  Cohen suggests that the “poor, ignorant and helpless” need more 
protection than more sophisticated clients because they are less likely to exercise 
judgment in hiring lawyers. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. See generally id. at 3–22.  
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I.  THE LIMITED LIABILITY MOVEMENT: WHERE WERE THE 
LAWYERS? 
Over the last century, the limited liability movement resulted in the 
most radical departure from a civil liability regime holding lawyers 
accountable for the acts and omissions of their law partners.  Unlike 
the business and tax-related interests behind allowing lawyers to 
practice in professional corporations, the push behind the limited 
liability partnership structure was the desire of lawyers to limit their 
vicarious liability for their partners’ professional malpractice.7  In 
lawyers’ campaign for limited liability, public protection was largely a 
secondary concern.8  While a few states included insurance 
requirements and other protections to provide some degree of public 
protection, injured parties’ ability to hold firm partners jointly and 
severally liable was virtually eliminated once the law firm converted 
to limited liability status.9  As the limited liability structure spread 
nationwide, few lawyers and commentators critically questioned the 
limited liability organizational structure as a retreat from public 
protection in favor of lawyer protection.  The following account of the 
genesis and growth of the limited liability partnership form illustrates 
that lawyers’ own interest in self-protection dominated both the 
discourse and outcome. 
 
 7. See Robert W. Hillman, Organizational Choices of Professional Service 
Firms: An Empirical Study, 58 BUS. LAW. 1387, 1391–96 (2006) (tracing the 
development of professional corporations, limited liability companies, and limited 
liability partnerships).  Although similar issues arise with respect to all limited 
liability vehicles that lawyers use to avoid vicarious liability, this Article focuses on 
the development and effect of the limited liability partnership structure.  Unlike the 
professional corporation and limited liability company structures, the LLP form 
stemmed solely from lawyers’ desire to escape liability for the acts and omissions of 
their partners. 
 8. For a discussion of the successful and rapid campaign of lawyers to gain 
limited liability protection, see Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible 
of Lawyer Self-Protection: Reflections on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 359, 
360 (1998).  Professor Wolfram warned that injured claimants “will end up paying for 
the gains lawyers thereby achieved.” Id.; see also Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking 
Shelter in the Minefield of Unintended Consequences—the Traps of Limited 
Liability Law Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 717, 724-29 (1997) (analyzing the 
internal and external consequences of converting to limited liability law firms). 
 9. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN 
ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, 
AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (2001) 165–66 tbl.3-1 (2011) 
(outlining statutory approaches to limit partners’ liability for partnership debts and 
obligations).  Only a few states impose insurance requirements in the LLP statute as 
a substitute for a partner’s individual liability. Id. § 2.06. 
FORTNEY_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:47 PM 
180 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
The birth of the LLP structure dates back to the 1980s and the 
savings and loan debacle involving the collapse of numerous financial 
institutions insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.10  In an 
effort to recoup hundreds of millions in losses, the government filed 
numerous cases against lawyers, accountants, and other professionals, 
alleging that the defendants’ conduct caused the financial institutions 
(and eventually the government) to suffer damages.11  In addition to 
suing the professionals’ firms, the government pursued claims against 
individual law firm partners, including those who were directly 
involved in the representation of the failed institutions, as well as 
other partners whose liability arose from their status as general 
partners in the defendant law firms.12  In various cases, the amount of 
damages that the government alleged far exceeded the amount of 
legal malpractice insurance available to the defendant firms.13 
To many, the government appeared to have both an unlimited war 
chest and zeal to recover as much as possible, even if it meant 
 
 10. For insights on the evolution of the LLP structure from the vantage point of 
the law professor who served as chair of the legislative committee for a Texas non-
profit group organized to support business-related legislation, see Robert W. 
Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships, Present at the Birth (Nearly), 
66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065 (1995). 
 11. See Ethan S. Burger, The Use of Limited Liability Entities for the Practice of 
Law: Have Lawyers Been Lulled into a False Sense of Security?, 40 TEX. J. BUS. L. 
175, 179 (2004) (describing the government’s efforts to recoup billions lost in 
connection with the savings and loan crisis). 
 12. In an attempt to maximize recovery, the government asserted both vicarious 
liability and direct liability claims against firm attorneys who were not directly 
involved in the representation.  The direct liability claims asserted that partners have 
an affirmative duty to monitor their peers.  For an analysis of the government’s 
allegations, see Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My Partner’s Keeper? Peer Review in Law 
Firms, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 329, 329–35 (1995). See also John S. Dzienkowski, Legal 
Malpractice and the Multistate Firm: Supervision of Multistate Offices; Firms as 
Limited Liability Partnerships; and Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Client 
Malpractice Claims, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 967, 981 n.68 (1995) (noting that in a high-
profile case the government sued firm partners regardless of whether they were at the 
defendant firm at the time of suit).  “By doing this, the government was suing 
different firms with different insurance policies and thus sought to obtain judgments 
against as many potential defendants as possible.” Id. 
 13. While in private practice, I represented a legal malpractice carrier that insured 
a number of law firms sued by the government in connection with failed financial 
institutions.  In connection with the claims against Jenkens & Gilchrest (J & G), the 
carrier attempted to obtain a declaratory judgment allowing it to tender to the court 
the amount remaining under the policy’s limits of liability.  After the trial court 
denied the petition, the government settled the cases against the insured law firm.  
Thereafter, the government continued to pursue claims to recover amounts under 
insurance policies issued to other firms who hired former J & G partners. 
FORTNEY_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:47 PM 
2012] THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY 181 
pursuing the personal assets of partners who were not directly 
involved in this representation of the failed financial institutions.14  
This was dramatically played out in litigation against Jenkens & 
Gilchrest (J & G), the now defunct Dallas-based law firm.  In a 
meeting with J & G lawyers and their defense counsel, government 
lawyers made their intentions clear when they used an overhead 
projector to show their analysis of the non-exempt net worth of J & G 
partners.15 
Beyond the individual defendants involved in the actions filed by 
the federal agencies, the litigation and the government’s aggressive 
posture captured the attention of thousands of lawyers who 
represented financial institutions.16  Other lawyers familiar with the 
litigation became concerned about the prospect of “innocent” 
partners being held jointly and severally liable for the acts and 
omissions of their peers.17 
In Lubbock, Texas, the city where the government had sued J & G 
in federal court, partners in Crenshaw, Dupree and Milam (CDM), a 
twenty-one-person law firm, first proposed the limited liability 
partnership concept.18  Because this was an established principle of 
partnership law, the CDM lawyers evidently recognized that it would 
take legislative action to eliminate unlimited liability for partners’ 
malpractice.19  The proponents elicited the assistance of a powerful 
state senator who introduced Texas Senate Bill 302, exclusively 
providing for limited liability for certain classes of professionals, 
including lawyers and accountants.20  The legislation eliminated 
vicarious liability for torts claims by adding the following language to 
the Texas version of the Uniform Partnership Act: 
A partner in a professional partnership is not individually liable, 
except to the extent of the partner’s interest in partnership property, 
for the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence or malfeasance 
committed in the course of rendering professional service on behalf 
 
 14. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1069 (noting that the government agencies 
devoted a “significant part of their total resources to the recovery of funds lost in the 
collapse of Texas institutions”).   
 15. Id. at 1071. 
 16. Id. (referring to the thousands of lawyers who watched the litigation unfold 
with the “but for the grace of God go I” reaction). 
 17. See Burger, supra note 11, at 178 (describing the confluence of events that 
motivated lawyers to seek liability protection). 
 18. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1066–74 (tracing the origin of the LLP 
concept and legislative initiatives). 
 19. Id. at 1072–73. 
 20. See id.; See also BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 3. 
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of the partnership by another partner, employee, or representation 
of the partnership.21 
The bill that created a “limited liability partnership” structure 
passed the Texas Senate with little attention or comment.22 
The initial reception in the Texas House of Representatives was far 
more negative.23  In the House, critics questioned the following 
features of the proposed legislation: 
(1) Including only professionals, particularly lawyers,  
(2) Relieving partners from responsibility for misconduct of those 
they directed or supervised (such as a doctor’s nurse or technician, a 
lawyer’s junior associate), 
(3) Failing to signal to patients and clients that their professionals’ 
liability was limited in complete reversal of historic and familiar 
partnership law, and  
(4) Failing to provide any substitute source of recovery for injured 
patients and clients.24 
Despite these objections, the pressure to pass the legislation was 
substantial.  Professor Alan R. Bromberg, a partnership law expert 
who had originally criticized the limited liability concept at the House 
hearing, later agreed to draft revisions to the bill to make it more 
acceptable.25  The revisions were designed to address the concerns by 
doing the following: 
(1) Extending the liability limitation to all partnerships, 
(2) Denying protection to partners for misconduct of those working 
under their supervision or direction, 
(3) Requiring annual registration [of the firm] with the state and the 
inclusion of “L.L.P.” or “registered limited liability partnership in 
the firm name,” and 
(4) Requiring [the L.L.P. to carry] liability insurance in an arbitrary 
and admittedly often inadequate amount of $100,000.26 
With these changes, the revised bill was “quietly attached” to an 
omnibus bill proposed by the Texas Business Law Foundation, a not-
 
 21. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 3. 
 22. Id. at 4. 
 23. Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1073 (identifying some of the criticisms). 
 24. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 4. 
 25. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1073–74.  
 26. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 4.  
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for-profit corporation organized by a group of corporate lawyers from 
major Texas law firms.27 
With the enactment of the first limited liability legislation in Texas, 
the ember of change that started in a conference room of a small law 
firm in Lubbock, Texas spread like wildfire.28  State by state, 
professionals lobbied for adoption of new legislation, arguing that it 
would be essential for the state to remain competitive in attracting 
and retaining business.29 
While lawyers and bar-related groups were lobbying for adoption 
of limited liability statutes, there appeared to be little resistance to 
passing legislation.  One Texas legislator who was a partner with a 
plaintiff’s firm first questioned the proposed Texas legislation as a 
“radical and undesirable proposal.”30  After some changes were made, 
the legislator withdrew his opposition.31  Consumer and client 
advocacy groups also did not play a significant role in challenging 
sweeping changes that allowed lawyers to practice in limited liability 
firms.32 
 
 27. Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1072, 1074 (noting that Democratic Governor 
Ann Richards allowed the bill to become effective without her signature).  While 
lawyers and bar-related groups were pushing for adoption of limited liability statutes, 
there appeared to be little resistance to passing legislation. Id.  One Texas legislator 
who was a partner with a plaintiff’s firm first questioned the proposed Texas 
legislation as a “radical and undesirable proposal.” Id. at 1073.  After some changes 
were made, the legislator withdrew his opposition. Id. 
 28. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 12 (“In 1994, 13 states adopted 
LLP provisions . . . [and] [a]bout the same number had adopted LLP during only the 
first half of 1995.”).  Around the world, various jurisdictions (including the United 
Kingdom and Canadian provinces) recognize the LLP form. Id. at 17. 
 29. See Elizabeth S. Miller, The Perils and Pitfalls of Practicing Law in a Texas 
Limited Liability Partnership, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 563, 564 (2011) (“The [LLP] 
concept was quickly copied in other states, and all states and the District of Columbia 
have since added LLP provisions to their partnership statutes.”).  
 30. Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1073.  “Two other legislators argued to lawyer 
witnesses, ‘You want your cake and yet you want to eat it too,’ and ‘If you want to 
swim with the sharks, you should recognize that you might get eaten by them.’” Id.  
Others questioned whether the bill was necessary because lawyers could limit their 
liability as Professional Corporations and resisted the legislation as “help-a–lawyer 
bill.” Id. 
 31. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 4. 
 32. See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Who Bears the Costs of Lawyers’ Mistakes?—
Against Limited Liability, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 885, 889 (2004) (noting that “legislatures 
adopted the new limited liability entity formats with minimal inquiry into normative 
consequences”). 
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As the limited liability movement spread across the nation, the 
protection that legislation provided actually expanded.33  As noted 
above, the first proposed legislation initially only protected 
professionals.34  The first statute that was adopted did not restrict 
protection to professionals, but limited the liability shield to vicarious 
liability claims relating to the malpractice of another firm partner.35  
In addition, the statute did not protect partners if another firm 
partner or representative working under the supervision or direction 
of the first partner committed the malpractice.36  In this sense, the first 
Texas statute only provided a “partial shield” because it only covered 
tort-type claims and preserved supervisory liability.  Subsequent 
statutes broadened the liability shield.  For example, the Delaware 
legislation covered contract as well as tort claims, and it narrowed 
supervisory liability to misconduct of someone under the partners’ 
“direct supervision and control.”37  Subsequently, other states 
eliminated the provisions that preserved vicarious liability for acts 
and omissions of supervised persons.38  By 2008, eighty percent of the 
states had adopted “full-shield” statutes, providing a liability shield 
for all debts and obligations of the partnership.39 
Bar association groups eagerly supported LLP legislation that 
eliminated “even the moderate restrictions on limited liability.”40  
Most notably, the American Bar Association (ABA), Business Law 
Section Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business 
Organizations Working Group on Registered Limited Liability 
Partnerships prepared prototype provisions for inclusion in the 
 
 33. For an account of how Delaware and other states expanded the statutory 
protection to extend to all liabilities, see BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 
1.01(b). 
 34. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 35. Miller, supra note 29, at 564 (describing the evolution of the Texas statute that 
originally shielded partners only from liability “arising out of the errors, omissions, 
negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance of other partners or representatives of the 
partnership”).  Later, “[i]n 1997, the LLP provisions in the Texas Revised 
Partnership Act were amended to provide protection from all debts and obligations 
of the partnership.” Id. at 564–65.  Most statutes now eliminate partners’ vicarious 
liability for all types of classes of claims. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 
101(c)-(d). 
 36. For a discussion of the unresolved issues related to supervisory liability, see 
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 126–28. 
 37. Id. at 10–11. 
 38. See id. at 165–69 tbl.3-1 (outlining the different approaches to supervisory 
liability). 
 39. Id. at 15. 
 40. Id. at 14. 
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Revised Uniform Partnership Act.41  These provisions limited 
vicarious liability for all kinds of debts and extended protection to 
persons other than practicing professionals.42 
At the American Law Institute (ALI), a tentative draft of the 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers included a section 
subjecting principals in a law firm to vicarious liability for the 
wrongful acts of firm principals and employees.43  At the 1997 annual 
meeting, ALI members rejected this approach, adopting a version 
that recognized lawyers’ ability to limit their liability.44  The ALI vote 
on the Restatement section related to the liability of firm principals 
exemplifies how lawyer self-interest influenced what should have 
been an impartial restatement of legal principles.45  In an insightful 
assessment of ALI deliberations and decisions on the content of the 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, Professor 
Monroe Freedman zeroed in on ALI members’ “conflict of interest” 
in allowing their independent judgment to be “materially and 
adversely affected by their own financial interests.”46 
Other bar-related groups, such as Professional Ethics Committees, 
also greased the way for law firms to practice as limited liability 
partnerships.  Both the American Bar Association Standing 
Committee on Professional Ethics and various state ethics 
committees opined that practice in limited liability firms did not 
 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Fortney, supra note 12, at 360 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1994)). 
 44. Id. at 362.  The ALI membership adopted the following provision: “Each of 
the principals of a law firm organized as a general partnership without limited 
liability is liable jointly and severally with the firm.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58 (2000) (emphasis added).  Based on this final 
version, Professors Bromberg and Ribstein state that the “Restatement explicitly 
recognizes limitation of lawyers’ liability in LLPs under applicable law.” BROMBERG 
& RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 258–59. 
 45. See Monroe H. Freedman, Caveat Lector: Conflicts of Interest of ALI 
Members in Drafting the Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 646–60 (1998) 
(analyzing three different issues that illustrate how lawyers’ own financial interests 
affected their independence in formulating sections of the Restatement of Law 
Governing Lawyers). 
 46. Id.  Professor Freedman warns that these conflicts of interest  
have compromised the integrity of the ALI’s Restatements of the Law to 
the point that no judge, scholar, or student can rely on a Restatement rule 
or comment as representing the objective judgment of members, unaffected 
by the partisanship of advocates who are creating precedents to protect 
their clients’ and their own interests in future litigation.  
Id. at 660. 
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violate applicable ethics rules, provided that firms comply with 
statutory provisions, such as those requiring that the firms use the 
words “Limited Liability Partnership” or the initials “LLP” in their 
name.47  Disappointingly, few opinions urged lawyers to take 
additional steps to communicate their limited liability status to clients 
and prospective clients.48 
Bar leaders and other lawyers who preached the status of law as a 
profession said little about how the limited liability movement 
dramatically changed the remedies available to persons injured by 
lawyers’ acts and omissions.49  Rather, lawyers operated out of self-
interest.50  In contrasting “professionalism” rhetoric with the bar’s 
role in lobbying for limited liability protection for lawyers, Professor 
Roger C. Cramton observed: 
In any setting in which lawyer professionalism is discussed, the 
profession laments the decline of mentoring in law firms and urges 
greater quality control measures.  Yet [in pushing for the enactment 
of state legislation eliminating the traditional rule that a law 
partner’s assets are at risk when a firm member’s negligence leads to 
a malpractice or third-party award] it rejected the principles of 
monitoring, group responsibility and quality control that underlie 
the traditional partnership rule.  Pocket-book interests have 
prevailed over “traditional professional values.”  Also, the organized 
bar usually takes the position that state legislatures have no business 
regulating the profession.  But when the common law rule proved 
 
 47. For a critique of the ABA Ethics Opinion, see Susan Saab Fortney, 
Professional Responsibility and Liability Issues Related to Limited Liability 
Partnerships, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 339, 405–22 (1998). 
 48. In Wisconsin, the Supreme Court recognized that lawyers seeking limited 
liability should do more than comply with the minimum statutory provisions.  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court amended the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, allowing lawyers to practice in LLPs and other 
limited liability organizations, provided that the lawyers give public and actual notice 
to clients. WIS. SUP. CT. R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS R. 20:5.7.  The rule 
imposes other conditions, including that a limited liability law firm “[i]nclude a 
written designation of the limited liability structure as part of its name.” Id.  In 
addition, the firm must “[p]rovide to clients and potential clients in writing a plain-
English summary of the features of the limited liability law under which [the firm] is 
organized.” Id. 
 49. See Wolfram, supra note 8, at 362 (noting that the bar played a pivotal role in 
pushing for limited liability legislation). 
 50. Id. 
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threatening, the bar sought and obtained immediate legislative 
action in many states.51 
Although professionals successfully lobbied for the enactment of 
limited liability legislation, state supreme courts could have exercised 
their inherent authority to prohibit or regulate practice in limited 
liability law firms.52  The vast majority acceded to the popular will of 
lawyers, doing little to stem the tide.53  In contrast to many, the 
Illinois Supreme Court resisted the pressure to simply bless allowing 
lawyers to practice in limited liability firms.54  After an extended 
period of study and submissions by interested groups, the Illinois 
Supreme Court eventually adopted a rule that allowed lawyers to 
limit their liability, provided that they complied with safeguards in the 
rule, including insurance and financial responsibility provisions.55  
 
 51. Roger C. Cramton, Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversary System 
and Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1613 n.48 
(2002). 
 52. “Bar associations have played a pivotal, if not very public, role in obtaining 
the legislation.  Indeed, very few bar groups opposed the legislation, and their 
opposition can be adequately explained on the ground of self-interest.” Wolfram, 
supra note 8, at 362 (analyzing the inherent powers doctrine and courts’ response to 
the organized bar’s push for limited liability legislation).  According to Professor 
Wolfram, the state’s highest court claim of exclusive “inherent powers” is embodied 
in two principles: 
The milder version of the claim involves judicial assertion of a constitutional 
power to regulate lawyers even in the absence of legislation.  Quite beyond 
that, most state supreme courts also claim the exclusive power to regulate 
lawyers as the court sees fit—even if the state’s legislature has enacted 
legislation that on its face is applicable to lawyers.  Under the latter claim, 
courts say they have both the power and the duty to strike down legislation 
interfering with the judicial power to regulate lawyers.  
Id. 
 53. Id. (“In contrast to the robust and highly successful bar activity, [Professor 
Wolfram notes] that most courts have not been involved in the LLP adoption process 
in any way.”). 
 54. The Illinois Bar Association and Chicago Bar Association petitioned the 
Illinois Supreme Court, proposing rules to allow lawyers to use statutory vehicles to 
limit lawyers’ vicarious liability.  The Illinois Supreme Court adopted rules “nearly 
identical” to those proposed in the petition. See Sheldon I. Banoff & Steven F. 
Pflaum, Limited Liability Legal Practice: New Opportunities and Responsibilities for 
Illinois Lawyers, CBA RECORD (Apr. 2003), available at 
http://www.kattenlaw.com/files/Publication/577a24dc-3a89-446f-a62a-
e577ba99ada0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f08f5eab-12c9-44c4-bbf4-
5bf5c287b0dc/Limited%20Liability%20Legal%20Practice.pdf (providing a detailed 
analysis of the Illinois approach from the perspectives of authors who participated in 
the drafting of the petition submitted to the Illinois Supreme Court). 
 55. Until Illinois adopted the rule, it was the only state that imposed unlimited 
vicarious liability on principals in law firms.  Illinois Rule 722 on Limited Liability 
Legal Practice now allows lawyers to limit their liability under the applicable state 
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Unlike the first Texas legislation, which merely required that firms 
carry limits of liability of $100,000, the Illinois rule set the minimum 
limits of liability for professional liability insurance as $100,000 per 
claim and $250,000 annual aggregate, multiplied by the number of 
lawyers in the firm, provided that the firm’s insurance need not 
exceed $5,000,000 per claim and $10,000,000 annual aggregate.56  
Through this rule, Illinois imposed meaningful financial responsibility 
requirements on lawyers seeking to limit their liability. 
Although a few other jurisdictions used insurance to address 
questions of public protection, most jurisdictions did not.57  Therefore, 
consumers in most states lost the unlimited liability protection 
afforded under general partnership law with limited or no assurance 
that firms would carry insurance or maintain assets adequate to pay 
claims.58  Had a public watchdog or consumer advocate group been 
more involved in monitoring the limited liability movement, the 
question is whether decision-makers would have imposed adequate 
insurance requirements as the cost of doing business in a limited 
liability firm. 
II.  MANDATORY LEGAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: HOW THE 
UNITED STATES DIFFERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES (IN NOT 
PROTECTING CONSUMERS) 
As the limited liability form spread to other countries, insurance 
need not be used as a quid pro quo for eliminating vicarious liability 
 
statutes provided that the entity maintains adequate insurance or proof of financial 
responsibility as defined in the Rule. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 722(b)(1). 
 56. As an alternative to purchasing insurance, the Illinois Rule provides that law 
firms may maintain proof of financial responsibility in a sum no less than the 
minimum required annual aggregate for adequate insurance for a limited liability 
entity.  Under the Rule, “proof of financial responsibility” means funds that are 
“specifically designated and segregated for the satisfaction of any judgments against a 
limited liability entity, and any of its owners or employees, entered by or registered in 
any court of competent jurisdiction in Illinois, arising out of wrongful conduct.” ILL. 
SUP. CT. R. 722(b)(3) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 57. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 64–65 (identifying eight statutes 
that impose insurance requirements).  In some states, other applicable law, such as 
licensing statutes or professional conduct rules, may require insurance or financial 
responsibility for limited liability firms. Id. at 65. 
 58. See Petition of the Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois State Bar 
Association at 1, In re Proposed Rules Regulating Vicarious Liability of Lawyers 
Practicing in Limited Liability Entities, No. 18095 (Ill. Mar. 27, 2002) (arguing that 
the protections in the proposed rule provided “more effective [protection] than 
vicarious liability as a means of ensuring that clients receive compensation for losses 
suffered due to malpractice”). 
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of firm principals.  Around the world, injured persons (as well as 
lawyers) were already protected because other jurisdictions, including 
most common law countries, require professional indemnity 
insurance for practicing lawyers.59  For example, law firms in the 
United Kingdom (UK) must carry at least £2,000,000 per claim and a 
limited liability company must carry at least £3,000,000 per claim.60  In 
its Handbook explaining standards of practice, the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority (SRA), the new national regulator in the UK, 
advises solicitors that they need professional indemnity insurance to 
practice.61  The Law Society for England and Wales describes the 
justification for mandating that solicitors maintain professional 
indemnity insurance (PII) as follows: 
PII also increases your financial security and serves an important 
public interest function by covering civil liability claims, including: 
certain related defence costs, and regulatory awards made against 
you.  It ensures that the public does not suffer loss as a result of your 
civil liability, which might otherwise be uncompensated.  This is 
important in maintaining public confidence in the integrity and 
standing of solicitors.62 
Regulators from other countries share this perspective in asserting 
that PII protects consumers as well as lawyers.63  Mandatory insurance 
protects injured persons who otherwise would be facing uncollectable 
losses because lawyers “go bare,” practicing with no insurance or 
inadequate limits of liability on their policies.64  Requiring minimum 
limits and types of insurance protects lawyers and clients from gaps in 
 
 59. Jennifer Ip & Nora Rock, Mandatory Professional Indemnity Insurance and a 
Mandatory Insurer: A Global Perspective, 10 LAWPRO MAG. 2, 10–11 (2011). 
 60. Id. at 10 (discussing the increased difficulty UK firms encountered in 
obtaining affordable PII for the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 insurance years).  For a 
table of PII requirements worldwide, see Professional Indemnity Insurance 
Requirements Around the World, PRACTICEPRO, http://practicepro.ca/LawPROmag/ 
ProfessionalIndemnity_AroundWorld.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2012). 
 61. Professional Liability Insurance, L. SOC’Y § 3.2 (July 4, 2012), 
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/practice-notes/professional-indemnity-
insurance/. 
 62. Id. 
 63. “In most common law jurisdictions, professional indemnity insurance for 
lawyers is made mandatory by law or by law society or bar association regulation.” Ip 
& Rock, supra note 59, at 11 (citing Professional Indemnity Insurance Requirements 
Around the World, LAWPRO MAG., http://www.practicepro.ca/LAWPROMag/ 
ProfessionalIndemnity_AroundWorld.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2013)).  
 64. Id.  
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coverage.65  Mandatory insurance also addresses the moral hazard of 
some uninsured lawyers negatively affecting the reputation of the 
legal profession when injured persons are left without recovery.66  
Finally, mandatory insurance may improve the accessibility and 
affordability of insurance.67 
Interestingly, the need to create a source for affordable insurance is 
what prompted Oregon decision makers to enact a mandatory 
insurance program in the 1970s.68  A brief historical note on legal 
malpractice insurance and the evolution of the Oregon system 
provides another example of how market forces and lawyer self-
interest sparked change. 
In the United States, legal malpractice insurance first gained 
prominence in the 1960s when property and casualty insurers offered 
legal malpractice insurance as an ancillary service.69  Lawyers became 
keenly interested in obtaining insurance in the 1970s when legal 
malpractice claims increased substantially.70  Many insurers 
responded to these claims by changing their approaches to 
underwriting and by sharply raising premiums.71  Other insurance 
companies simply discontinued writing legal malpractice insurance in 
certain states.72  Because of these changes, the coverage provided 
decreased and the cost of insurance increased.73 
 
 65. Id. (explaining that lawyers who obtain insurance on their own initiative 
expose themselves and their clients to “potentially dangerous gaps in coverage”). 
 66. Id. at 12 (referring to this as a “free-rider” problem that Scandinavian 
regulators cited as a reason for requiring that all members obtain insurance). 
 67. See Bennett J. Wasserman & Krishna J. Shah, Mandatory Legal Malpractice 
Insurance: The Time Has Come, N.J. L.J., Jan. 14, 2010 (arguing that the extension of 
insurance to all lawyers would make premiums more affordable).  “With increased 
competition in the insurance marketplace . . . the resulting revenue infusion to 
carriers by mandating insurance coverage would not only lower premiums, but it 
would extend protection to all clients . . . .” Id. 
 68. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 69. George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A 
Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305, 307 (1998); see 
also Fredric L. Goldfein, Legal Malpractice Insurance, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1285, 1285 
(1988) (noting that it was not until the 1960s that insurers realized that they could 
make a profit).  
 70. See Cohen, supra note 69, at 308 (tracing developments that contributed to 
the expansion of lawyers’ liability exposure). 
 71. Insurers radically changed the coverage provided by changing policies to be 
“claims-made” rather than occurrence policies and by revising the insuring 
agreements to provide for deducting defense costs from the limits of liability 
available to pay damages. Id. 
 72. “In some jurisdictions, such as California, insurers started dropping out of the 
legal malpractice insurance market and focusing on more profitable and stable 
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By the late 1970s, the market in various states became very 
restrictive, making legal malpractice insurance cost prohibitive for 
many and unavailable to others.74  Lawyer organizations around the 
United States evaluated options to deal with the tough and expensive 
insurance market.75  In some states, lawyers established bar-related 
mutual companies, owned by lawyers, to provide affordable 
insurance.76  In other states, including California and Washington, 
lawyers explored the possibility of lowering insurance costs by 
requiring all lawyers to purchase insurance.77  Although the California 
governor refused to sign proposed legislation requiring lawyers to 
carry insurance, the state of Oregon “borrowed the proposed 
California legislation and passed it as its own.”78  On July 1, 1978, 
Oregon established a mandatory insurance program in an attempt to 
deal with the insurance “crisis” where many lawyers were “simply 
unable to obtain insurance at a reasonable price.”79  Thus, Oregon 
became the first state in the U.S. to require that all lawyers in private 
practice obtain insurance through the state’s professional liability 
fund (PLF).80 
 
areas.” Id. (citing ISSUES IN FORMING A BAR-RELATED PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 
INSURANCE COMPANY 4 (ABA Standing Comm. on Lawyers’ Professional Liability 
ed., 1989)). 
 73. See Goldfein, supra note 69, at 1285 (“By the end of the 1970’s, premiums 
began to increase sharply.”).  For a description of how “claims-made” coverage is 
more restrictive than “occurrence” coverage, see id. at 1286–90. 
 74. See id. at 1285 (citing Smith, Cautious Optimism—An Overview of Lawyer 
Malpractice, 12 B. LEADER 13, 14 (1989)). 
 75. See Cohen, supra note 69, at 309–31 (chronicling bar initiatives to make 
insurance more accessible and affordable). 
 76. California and North Carolina organized the first bar-related insurance 
companies. See id. at 308.  Numerous states followed, creating bar-related companies 
that write insurance and provide risk management services.  For a listing of the bar-
related companies, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BAR-RELATED INSURANCE 
COMPANIES, http://www.nabrico.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).  As stated on the 
website for the National Association of Bar-Related Insurance Companies, affiliated 
member companies are “dedicated to personal service, quality coverage, and the 
satisfaction of their insureds.” Id. 
 77. “Legislators believed that [mandatory coverage through state-endorsed funds] 
would greatly assist a growing number of attorneys who were unable to obtain 
insurance, as well as protect clients who were represented by uninsured attorneys.” 
Goldfein, supra note 69, at 1296. 
 78. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law 
Professors, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2583, 2610 (1996). 
 79. Goldfein, supra note 69, at 1296; Ramos, supra note 78, at 2610. 
 80. By legislative enactment, the board of governors for the unified state bar 
association has the authority to require all active members of the state bar engaged in 
the private practice of law whose principal offices are in Oregon to carry professional 
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Interestingly, the Oregon Bar Association originally proposed the 
mandatory insurance program with the hope that it would “provide 
lower rates, make coverage more available, and protect the public 
from harm by uninsured attorneys.”81  “The Oregon State Bar 
Association determined that [the PLF] would cost individual 
[lawyers] less than comparable . . . insurance.”82  In commenting on 
the Oregon Bar Association’s role in supporting a mandatory 
insurance program, one malpractice expert noted that “[a]ltruism, or 
concern for the consumer, was not entirely behind Oregon’s decision 
to establish the PLF.”83  Lawyers and bar leaders recognized that the 
mandatory insurance program made economic sense for lawyers.84 
In arguing for mandatory legal malpractice insurance, 
commentators often point to the success of the Oregon PLF 
program.85  Notwithstanding the Oregon experience in making 
insurance and loss prevention services accessible to all lawyers in 
private practice, organized bar groups and other interested bodies 
have staunchly and successfully opposed mandatory insurance.86  As 
 
liability insurance. See OR. REV. STAT. § 752.035 (2011).  Currently, the professional 
liability fund commission requires that “qualified members of the profession . . . carry 
professional liability insurance offered by the fund with primary liability limits of at 
least $200,000.” Id.  
 81. Goldfein, supra note 69, at 1296. 
 82. Nicole A. Cunitz, Note, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance for Lawyers: Is 
There a Possibility of Public Protection Without Compulsion?, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 637, 652 (1995). 
 83. Ramos, supra note 78, at 2610. 
 84. See id. at 2610–12 (analyzing the pricing structure).  Although initially met by 
heavy criticism, past survey results suggest that members of the Oregon Bar are 
satisfied with services provided. See Nicholas A. Marsh, Note, “Bonded & Insured?”: 
The Future of Mandatory Insurance Coverage and Disclosure Rules for Kentucky 
Attorneys, 92 KY. L.J. 793, 800 n.56 (2004) (citing the Oregon PLF website that 
reported on survey results indicating that 99% of the respondents indicated that they 
were “satisfied” and 87% reported that they were “very satisfied” with services 
provided by the PLF). 
 85. See, e.g., Ramos, supra note 78, at 2611–12 (asserting that “Oregon’s PLF has 
been a success and a model for any insurance carrier”); Cunitz, supra note 82, at 651–
52.  In advocating that every state should follow Oregon’s example, the vice-
president of an international insurance broker and risk-management consulting 
group notes that most of the arguments against mandatory insurance deal mostly 
with “logistics, not substance.” David Z. Webster, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance, 
Yes: It’s Essential to Public Trust, 79 A.B.A. J. 44, 44 (1993).  Mr. Webster concludes 
by stating: “Oregon has solved the logistics problem and, as an added benefit, has 
reduced cost and developed a credible loss-control program and a workable claims 
statistical base.  But most important, Oregon has assured the client public protection 
in the event of lawyer malpractice.” Id. 
 86. In explaining why the Oregon model of mandatory insurance has “stayed only 
in Oregon,” Manuel Ramos summarizes the opposition as follows: 
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noted by Professor Leslie Levin, “[w]hile Australia, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom have long required lawyers to carry malpractice 
insurance, bar resistance to mandatory insurance continues unabated 
in the U.S.”87  Some outspoken opponents of mandatory insurance 
would require lawyers to disclose that they do not carry malpractice 
insurance.88  As discussed in the next section, the debate over a 
mandatory disclosure rule reflects different perspectives on consumer 
protection and law as a business or profession. 
III.  MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF INSURANCE: WHAT THE 
DEBATE REVEALS ABOUT LAWYER ATTITUDES 
Following study and examination by bar groups, various states 
have rejected proposals for mandatory insurance programs.89  As a 
middle ground approach to requiring insurance or continuing the 
status quo, a number of jurisdictions have adopted rules requiring 
that lawyers disclose the fact that they do not carry professional 
 
Lawyers in other states do not like it.  The ABA is against it.  Insurance 
carriers oppose it.  Many attorneys would prefer not to pay several thousand 
dollars a year in premiums, and believe that the best insurance is to be 
“bare”: it is cheaper and most plaintiff’s attorneys will simply not bother to 
prosecute a legal malpractice case against them.  Insurance carriers do not 
like the idea of legislation that might put them out of business.  ALAS, the 
nation’s largest legal malpractice insurer based on premium income, is 
opposed to mandatory insurance because “it simply does not work.”  The 
Alliance of American Insurance is also against mandatory legal malpractice 
insurance: “Guaranteeing injured clients the means to collect gets beyond 
what the insurance product is designed to do.” Because any mandatory . . . 
insurance program must cover all lawyers, it is unlikely that any insurance 
carrier will commit to writing a state’s mandatory program.  Insurance 
companies relegated to offering excess coverage would soon see premium 
income decrease substantially. Some might even go out of business. 
Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice Insurance: The Profession’s Dirty Little Secret, 
47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1728–29 (1994) (footnotes omitted).  Professor Ramos 
concludes by stating that these arguments against mandatory legal malpractice 
insurance are unsupportable from the standpoint of consumer protection. See id. 
 87. Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad Decisionmaking: Lessons 
from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1549, 1588 
(2009) (reviewing RICHARD ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (2008)). 
 88. Harry H. Schneider, Jr., Mandatory Malpractice Insurance, No: An Invitation 
to Frivolous Suits, 79 A.B.A. J. 45 (1993) (suggesting that insurance disclosure is a 
“less divisive and less expensive” way of accomplishing the goal of public protection). 
 89. See, e.g., Robert I. Johnston & Kathryn Lease Simpson, O Brothers, O 
Sisters, Art Thou Insured?, 24 PA. LAW. 28, 30 (2002) (explaining that studies 
conducted by the Pennsylvania Bar Association Professional Liability Committee 
concluded that a mandatory insurance proposal was not realistic in a state with a bar 
the size of Pennsylvania). 
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liability insurance.90  Bar leaders representing large bar associations, 
as well as small ones, view mandatory disclosure of insurance status as 
a starting point on the road to improving client protection.91 
In the United States, state supreme courts, rather than bar 
associations, led the trend to adopt rules of professional conduct that 
require that lawyers disclose their lack of insurance.92  The Supreme 
Court of Alaska broke new ground in 1999 when it became the first 
state to amend its professional conduct rules to mandate disclosure of 
a lack of insurance.93  That same year, South Dakota used a similar 
approach in modifying the state professional conduct rules to require 
insurance disclosure to clients and potential clients in 
communications with them.94  Within a couple of years, other courts, 
including the Supreme Courts of Ohio and New Hampshire, adopted 
rules requiring lawyers who lack malpractice insurance to notify their 
clients.95 
 
 90. For a discussion of insurance “status disclosure” as an ideological compromise 
between camps that are concerned about interests of the “lawyers and health of the 
legal profession on one side and the rights of the consuming public on the others,” 
see Farbod Solaimani, Watching the Client’s Back: A Defense of Mandatory 
Insurance Disclosure Laws, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 963, 974–75 (2006). 
 91. Compare James E. Towery, The Case in Favor of Mandatory Disclosure of 
Lack of Malpractice Insurance, 14 PROF. LAW. 22 (2003) (the former president of the 
California Bar Association arguing that a lawyer’s lack of insurance is a “material 
fact” clients are entitled to know), with James C. Gallagher, Should Lawyers Be 
Required to Disclose Whether They Have Malpractice Insurance?, 32 VT. B. J. 5 
(2006) (former president of the Vermont Bar Association asserting that lawyers 
should have to disclose their insurance status because of the heightened obligations 
lawyers owe clients). 
 92. James E. Towery, Should Disclosure of Malpractice Insurance Be Mandatory, 
GP SOLO, Apr.–May 2003, available at http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/ 
publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_magazine_index/towery.html.  Mr. 
Towery chaired the ABA Standing Committee on Client Protection and served past 
president of the State Bar of California. By statute enacted in 1988, California first 
required a form of malpractice insurance disclosure in certain fee contracts. Id.  This 
provision was later “sunsetted” and not reenacted. Id.   
 93. Jeffrey D. Watters, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them: Why Clients 
Should Know if Their Attorney Does Not Carry Malpractice Insurance, 62 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 245, 257 (2010).   
 94. South Dakota’s rule now is considered to be the most stringent reporting 
requirement because it requires disclosure to the client or potential client in every 
communication with them. Id.  The Rule also covers the presentation of the 
disclosure and extends the requirements to every advertisement by the attorney, 
whether written or in the media. Id. 
 95. Towery, supra note 92, at 38.  In a reported case, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for twenty-four months for violations of 
the Ohio Professional Conduct Rules, including the rule that required the lawyer to 
inform a client, in a writing signed by the client, if the lawyer does not maintain 
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While additional state high courts were considering the disclosure 
issue, the ABA Client Protection Committee tackled the disclosure 
issue.  After unsuccessfully floating proposals, including one to 
amend the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the Committee 
changed its approach and recommended an ABA Model Court Rule 
on Insurance Disclosure (ABA Model Court Rule).96  Unlike 
professional conduct rules that required lawyers to disclose their lack 
of insurance directly to clients, the ABA Model Court Rule requires 
that lawyers disclose on their annual registration statements whether 
they intend to maintain professional liability insurance for their 
private law practices.97  The ABA Model Court Rule was considered 
to be more “lawyer friendly” than the professional conduct rules, 
adopted in states such as Alaska and South Dakota, because violation 
of a court rule would not subject a lawyer to professional discipline.98  
Although the ABA Model Court Rule was “lawyer friendly,” it only 
passed the House of Delegates by a narrow eleven-vote margin.99 
As of August 9, 2011, seventeen states have adopted mandatory 
disclosure rules that follow the ABA Model Court Rule approach 
that requires disclosure on lawyers’ annual registration statements, 
rather than disclosure directly to clients and prospective clients.100  
 
professional liability insurance. See generally Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Trainor, 950 
N.E.2d 524 (Ohio 2011). 
 96. Richard Acello, Climate Change: States Warm to the Disclosure of Liability 
Coverage, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/ 
article/climate_change/. 
 97. ABA Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure, ABA STANDING COMM. ON 
CLIENT PROTECTION (Aug. 9, 2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/cpr/clientpro/Model_Rule_InsuranceDisclosure.authcheckdam.pdf 
[hereinafter ABA Model Court Rule]. 
 98. Watters, supra note 93, at 255. Under the ABA Model Court Rule, the highest 
court of the jurisdiction will designate the means for making disclosure information 
available to the public. ABA Model Court Rule, supra note 97. 
 99. 5 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 38.1 
(2012) (noting that the ABA rule focuses on the “fact and maintenance of insurance” 
rather than the amount of insurance). 
 100. State Implementation of ABA Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure, 
ABA STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROTECTION (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibil
ity/chart_implementation_of_mcrid_080911.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter State 
Implementation Chart].  States vary on public access to the information that lawyers 
disclose on their registration statements.  Some make information available on the 
state website, others on request, and others do not allow public access to information. 
See Watters, supra note 93, at 256. 
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Another seven states require disclosure directly to clients.101  HALT, 
a self-described legal reform group, strongly urged that states go 
beyond the ABA “baseline recommendation” by requiring that 
lawyers directly disclose to clients whether or not they carry 
malpractice insurance.102 
Although the ABA Model Rule attempts to balance lawyer and 
consumer interests, five states have declined to adopt any version of 
an insurance disclosure rule.103  North Carolina also joined the states 
that do not require disclosure.  As of January 1, 2010, North Carolina 
eliminated the requirement for lawyers to inform the state bar 
whether they maintain legal malpractice insurance.104 
In each state that considered a mandatory insurance disclosure 
rule, lawyers passionately asserted arguments supporting their 
positions.  The arguments articulated in favor of adoption of a rule 
largely focused on public protection concerns, while opposing 
arguments pointed to the negative consequences of adoption of such 
a mandatory disclosure rule.  The following synopsis of the main 
arguments reveals that the proponents and opponents fundamentally 
differ on their perspectives of lawyer duties and the effects of 
adopting a rule related to a lawyer’s insurance status. 
Proponents advance a number of justifications for mandating that 
lawyers disclose whether they carry professional liability insurance.  
These arguments cover both client protection issues, as well as lawyer 
protection issues.  A common client protection argument relates to 
disparate positions of lawyers and their clients.  The vast majority of 
lay people enter an attorney-client relationship with little or no 
information on a lawyer’s insurance status or the lawyer’s ability to 
pay damages in the event of loss.  Unless the person is a sophisticated 
 
 101. The following states require disclosure directly to clients: Alaska, California, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. State 
Implementation Chart, supra note 100. 
 102. HALT Status Update: Does Your State Require Lawyers to Make Their 
Insurance Status Known, HALT, http://www.halt.org/reform_projects/ 
lawyer_accountability/pdf/Malpractice_insurance_disclosure_091505.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2012) [hereinafter HALT Report].  In comments to the Illinois Supreme 
Court, HALT argued that disclosure in registration papers merely assures that the 
high court will be informed of an attorney’s insurance status, but does not guarantee 
that clients will have access to the information. Id. 
 103. The following states have rejected a disclosure rule: Arkansas, Connecticut, 
Florida, Kentucky, and Texas. State Implementation Chart, supra note 100. 
 104. Frequently Asked Questions, N.C. ST. B., http://www.ncbar.gov/faq/f_faq.asp 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2012) (noting that clients must check with their lawyers if the 
clients want to obtain information on the lawyer’s legal malpractice insurance 
coverage). 
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consumer of legal services, prospective clients likely do not inquire 
about insurance.  Study results suggest that the majority of consumers 
do not know whether lawyers are required to carry professional 
liability insurance.105  Lay consumers may assume that lawyers are 
required to carry insurance.106 
To address the asymmetry and lack of information, proponents 
maintain that states should require disclosure when lawyers do not 
carry professional liability insurance.107  This argument is based on the 
duty of lawyers to disclose information that is material to 
representation.  As stated by James Towery, a former president of the 
California Bar Association and supporter of mandatory disclosure: 
[W]hen a client hires a lawyer, is the lawyer’s lack of insurance a 
material fact that the client is entitled to know?  It is hard to fashion 
a persuasive argument that clients are not entitled to that 
information.  Lawyers operate under a state license, and have a 
monopoly on “practicing law.”  With that monopoly go certain 
obligations. Full disclosure to clients of material information 
regarding the representation is certainly one of those obligations.108 
The special nature of the attorney-client relationship also militates 
in favor of disclosure.  Because members of the legal profession have 
a “heightened responsibility in business relationships with clients,” 
James C. Gallagher, a former president of the Vermont Bar 
Association, urged adoption of a mandatory disclosure rule so that 
clients can make informed decisions about retaining a lawyer.109 
Unless consumers possess sufficient information on a lawyer’s 
insurance status, they cannot make an “efficient risk assessment” as 
 
 105. According to a public opinion survey conducted for the State Bar of Texas, 
eighty-seven percent of respondents reported that they did not ask if their attorneys 
carried professional liability insurance. PLI Disclosure Survey of the Public, ST. B. 
TEX. (Nov. 2009), http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/PublicSurvey.pdf.  
The State Bar of Texas contracted with North Texas State University to conduct a 
telephone survey of 500 Texas residents, reflective of the demographics of Texas. Id. 
 106. Devin S. Mills & Galina Petrova, Modeling Optimal Mandates: A Case Study 
on the Controversy over Mandatory Professional Liability Coverage and Its 
Disclosure, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1029, 1033 (2009) (referring to studies that 
reveal that most clients assume that their attorneys are covered). 
 107. For a analysis of the asymmetric distribution of information in the attorney-
client relationship, see Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and 
Therefore Clients) Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 747, 751–55 (2008). 
 108. Towery, supra note 91, at 23 (suggesting those attorneys who question the 
materiality of insurance information put the question to a cross-section of their 
clients). 
 109. To support his position, Mr. Gallagher refers to court opinions that describe 
the special nature of the lawyer-client relationship. Gallagher, supra note 91, at 5. 
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to whether they wish to hire the lawyer.110  To illustrate this point, 
consider the example of a claimant in a large personal injury case 
where the claimant is selecting between two different personal injury 
lawyers.  The lawyers charge the same contingency fee, but one 
maintains legal malpractice insurance and the other does not.  
Retaining a lawyer without knowing whether the lawyer carries 
insurance is like purchasing a car without airbags.  Unless the lawyer 
has substantial non-exempt assets, there is likely no safety mechanism 
to protect the client in the event of lawyer error or misconduct.111 
Failure to require disclosure shifts risk of loss to consumers who 
rely on the superior position of their lawyers.112  As noted by a 
member of the Pennsylvania Professional Liability Committee, clients 
with meritorious claims suffer double injury when they are injured, 
first by a lawyer who they thought would protect them, and second 
when they do not have recourse because the lawyer had no 
coverage.113 
Often malpractice plaintiffs’ lawyers do not pursue actions against 
lawyers who do not carry professional liability insurance.114  
Recognizing this, practitioners may see “going naked” as an 
“effective strategy for avoiding lawsuits but it comes at the cost of 
 
 110. Mills & Petrova, supra note 106, at 1034. 
 111. According to a 2008 public opinion survey conducted by the State Bar of 
Texas Task Force on Insurance Disclosure, eighty percent of respondents indicated 
that it was “very important” or “moderately important” for them to know whether 
the attorney they are hiring carries insurance. Watters, supra note 93, at 247.  In 
addition, seventy percent of the respondents agreed that lawyers should inform 
potential clients whether or not the lawyer carries insurance. Id. at 247–48. 
 112. See Mills & Petrova, supra note 106, at 1032-33 (“Not requiring malpractice 
insurance, and not requiring attorneys to disclose any lack of coverage, unfairly 
forces legal clients to bear the burden of risk of loss . . . . Furthermore, when lawyers 
are the casual agents of malpractice damages, and their clients are the victims, it 
seems incongruous that potential victims should be the ones to carry the risk of 
malpractice resulting in financial loss.”).  
 113. Johnston & Simpson, supra note 89, at 32; see also Nicole D. Mignone, 
Comment, The Emperor’s New Clothes? Cloaking Client Protection Under the New 
Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1069, 1083 (2005) 
(noting that the grievance process inadequately provides financial compensation for 
aggrieved clients).  In most states, Client Protection Fund programs provide limited 
recovery for a narrow class of claims.  For a discussion of the scope of coverage 
protected by client protection funds, see LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, 
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 148 (3d ed. 2012) (explaining that 
client protection funds are state-sponsored programs designed to reimburse clients 
whose lawyers have stolen their money).  “Many client protection funds reimburse 
only a fraction of the valid claims that are submitted to them.” Id. at 152. 
 114. “Legal malpractice cases are rarely pursued against an uninsured attorney 
unless that attorney has significant assets.” Ramos, supra note 86, at 1727. 
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protecting the interests of clients.”115  As explained by Robert 
Fellmeth, Executive Director of the Center for Public Interest Law at 
the University of San Diego School of Law: 
When you run naked it means you’re immune—no one’s going to 
sue you.  Malpractice attorneys don’t sue attorneys who don’t have 
coverage.  What’s the point of getting a judgment and you don’t 
know whether you can execute on it?  Attorneys know how to hide 
assets.  If you’re a marginal practitioner, it pays to go naked.  So the 
consumer has no recourse, and it’s a disgrace.116 
The likelihood of being injured by an uninsured lawyer is 
significant because a substantial percentage of lawyers do not carry 
professional liability insurance.117  Although there is a great deal of 
speculation on the number of uninsured lawyers in private practice, 
surveys suggest that the percentages of uninsured attorneys range 
from seventeen percent to forty-eight percent.118 
The adoption of mandatory insurance disclosure rules reduces the 
number of uninsured lawyers by creating incentives for lawyers to buy 
insurance.119  First, the “strategy of going naked” becomes far less 
attractive if lawyers must disclose that they do not carry insurance.  
Second, the prospect of having to disclose one’s insurance status may 
help lawyers recognize that costs associated with insurance coverage 
are part of the costs of practicing law. 
Some proponents also assert that mandatory disclosure rules deter 
lawyer misconduct.  The deterrence argument is based on the 
assumption that lawyers will engage in risk management in an effort 
 
 115. Acello, supra note 96 (quoting Robert Fellmeth). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Johnston & Simpson, supra note 89, at 28 (noting that in 2001 the 
insurance industry and bar officials estimated that the percentage of uninsured 
lawyers in the United States ranged from twenty percent to fifty percent at any given 
time). 
 118. The lower end of this estimate is based on findings in a mandatory survey of 
lawyers conducted at the direction of the Illinois Supreme Court. Id. at 29 (quoting 
the chief counsel of the Illinois State Bar Association who noted that that the 
“general feeling was that something needs to be done” even though the numbers 
came in slightly better than projected).  The upper end of the estimate derives from 
6,160 responses to a Professional Liability Survey distributed by the State Bar of 
Texas in 2008. See PLI Disclosure—Attorney Survey Findings, ST. B. TEX. (Feb. 
2008), http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/11_Attorney_Survey_0208.pdf. 
 119. After South Dakota adopted a mandatory disclosure rule the number of 
insured attorneys in the state rose from eighty percent to ninety-six percent. Carole J. 
Buckner, Malpractice Insurance Disclosure Lurches Toward Approval, ORANGE 
COUNTY LAW, April 2008, at 51. 
FORTNEY_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2013  5:47 PM 
200 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
to avoid premium increases.120  The positive effects of purchasing 
insurance first occur when an uninsured lawyer applies for insurance, 
completing application questions that require a description of practice 
management controls such as conflict and calendar systems.  
Thereafter, insurers may provide risk management guidance and 
assist the insured in properly handling situations after the lawyers 
report errors to their carriers.121 
Many insured lawyers support mandatory disclosure rules.  These 
lawyers have observed how innocent lawyers get sucked into 
litigation when the actual tortfeasors do not carry insurance.122  The 
increased number of malpractice claims makes this more of a threat 
for responsible lawyers who carry insurance.123 
Finally, proponents argue that disclosure rules balance lawyer 
autonomy and client protection.124  Mandatory disclosure rules allow 
lawyers to elect to purchase insurance or disclose their insurance 
status.  At the same time, consumers of legal services are provided 
information so that they can make informed choices.  Once lawyers 
disclose their insurance status, consumers can make the choice to 
retain other counsel, disregard the lack of insurance, or to request 
that the lawyer obtain coverage.125  Thus, mandatory disclosure rules 
give consumers choices.  At the same time, disclosure rules do not 
force lawyers to purchase malpractice insurance, but create incentives 
for them to do so. 
 
 120. Mignone, supra note 113, at 1083 (suggesting that disclosure rules would lead 
attorneys to deliver legal services with greater care). 
 121. See Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law 
Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 220–25 (1996) (describing the types and 
effectiveness of risk management programs conducted by insurers). 
 122. See Johnston & Simpson, supra note 89, at 32 (explaining that members of the 
Pennsylvania Professional Liability Committee have seen responsible lawyers drawn 
into malpractice suits because another lawyer involved in the matter proved to be 
uninsured). 
 123. Mills & Petrova, supra note 106, at 1033 (citing Ronald E. Mallen, Cutting 
Through the Malpractice Maze, THE BRIEF, Summer 1986, at 10, 12–13). For a 
discussion of the statistical evidence of a dramatic increase in legal malpractice 
claims, see Judith L. Maute, Bar Associations, Self-Regulation and Consumer 
Protection Whither Thou Goest?, J. PROF. LAW. 2008, at 66–69. 
 124. See, e.g., Solaimani, supra note 90, at 974–75 (analyzing whether mandatory 
insurance disclosure is a “perfect ideological compromise” between client and lawyer 
interests). 
 125. Arguably, a “materiality-based” communications rule, such as one advocated 
by Professor Eli Wald, would cover a disclosure of a lawyer’s insurance status. See 
Wald, supra note 107, at 751–55, 779–80 (justifying a “materiality-based” disclosure 
rule on the basis of the nature of the attorney-client relationship and the asymmetric 
distribution of information in the relationship). 
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Lawyers who oppose mandatory disclosure rules do not see those 
rules as a compromise that preserves lawyer independence.126  Rather 
they assert that disclosure rules intrude on the choices lawyers should 
be able to make in representing clients.127  Specifically, they argue that 
mandatory disclosure rules interfere with a practitioner’s autonomy 
to decide whether to self-insure or purchase insurance.128  By opening 
the door to more regulation of the business aspects of running a law 
practice, some fear that mandating disclosure is the beginning of a 
slippery slope of more restrictions on how lawyers practice.129  
Another concern related to lawyer independence is that mandatory 
insurance disclosure rules give too much power to insurance 
companies.130 
Those who oppose mandatory disclosure maintain that proponents 
have failed to demonstrate an actual need for mandating disclosure of 
insurance status.  Specifically, they point to the lack of evidence for 
widespread occurrences of legal malpractice committed by uninsured 
lawyers.131  Opponents also argue that a mandatory disclosure rule is 
unnecessary because consumers may always inquire as to whether a 
lawyer carries insurance.132  Opponents maintain that consumers 
 
 126. See, e.g., Charles Wood, Few Fans of Mandatory Disclosure, MONT. LAW., 
June–July 2002, at 11 (referring to opposition of Montana attorneys who argued that 
mandating insurance disclosure was “playing into the hands of the malpractice 
insurance companies by forcing more lawyers to buy coverage rather than be 
embarrassed by a disclosure statement”). 
 127. See Acello, supra note 96, at 41 (referring to a “don’t tread on me” attitude 
that may be at play in resisting mandatory disclosure). 
 128. Steve N. Six, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance Disclosure: Is the Time Right 
for Kansas?, 72 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 14, 14 (2003) (noting that a mandatory rule makes 
no allowance for the fact that some lawyers have adequate financial resources to 
cover claims). 
 129. Mignone, supra note 113, at 1086; see also Mark Hansen, More States Require 
Lawyers to Say Whether They Carry Malpractice Insurance, A.B.A. J., May 23, 2006, 
available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/disclosure_rules/. 
 130. See Hansen, supra note 129.  For a discussion of the emerging role of insurers 
as regulators of the legal profession, see Davis, supra note 121, at 220–32. See 
generally Charles Silver, Professional Liability Insurance as Insurance and as Lawyer 
Regulation: Response to Davis, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 233 (1996).  
 131. See Mills & Petrova, supra note 106, at 1034 (articulating the counter 
argument that “absence of proof is not the proof of absence”); see also Towery, supra 
note 91, at 23 (suggesting that the lack of evidence of unsatisfied judgments against 
uninsured lawyers can be attributed to the fact that claims against uninsured lawyers 
are “often abandoned, precisely because there is no available insurance”). 
 132. See Wood, supra note 126, at 11 (quoting a Montana attorney who insisted 
that potential clients should be accountable for asking about an attorney’s insurance 
status). 
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consider a variety of factors when retaining counsel, including the 
lawyer’s experience and disciplinary record.133 
In opposing mandatory disclosure, critics point to a variety of 
unintended consequences that arise from mandating disclosure.  Most 
notably, they warn that more information on insurance will “invite 
frivolous lawsuits.”134  They also argue that the mandatory insurance 
rule will eventually increase the cost of legal fees because lawyers 
likely would transfer insurance costs to consumers of legal services.135 
Some of the most vocal critics argue that adoption of mandatory 
disclosure rules will disproportionately affect solo and small firm 
lawyers.136  They assert that many solo and small firm practitioners 
cannot afford insurance and therefore disclosure rules will unfairly 
stigmatize them.137 
To lawyers familiar with professional liability coverage, the most 
persuasive criticism is that mandatory disclosure actually misleads lay 
people.138  Because of the claims-made nature of professional liability 
insurance, opponents argue that disclosure will adversely affect 
clients who assume that coverage exists when it does not.139  Unlike 
occurrence policies, claims-made policies cover claims that are made 
and reported during the policy term.  Therefore, lawyers who disclose 
 
 133. Edward C. Mendrzycki, Should Disclosure of Malpractice Insurance Be 
Mandatory?—Con, GP SOLO, Apr.–May 2003, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_sol
o_magazine_index/towery.html (asserting that there is “no empirical evidence 
showing that simply stating that a lawyer is uninsured offers any useful information to 
a client who is making a decision whether to hire counsel”). 
 134. Mignone, supra note 113, at 1086 (referring to opposition expressed by an 
ABA delegate).  In supporting their position, critics can use the proponents’ own 
argument that malpractice lawyers do not pursue claims against uninsured 
professionals. 
 135. Cunitz, supra note 82, at 656–57. 
 136. See Buckner, supra note 119, at 51–52 (noting that opponents of the proposed 
disclosure rule “predicted consequences ranging from premium increases, rising costs 
for legal services, reduction in availability of low-cost legal services, increases in 
malpractice claims and the demise of small firm and solo law practices”).   
 137. Marsh, supra note 84, at 810 (suggesting that stigma is “especially problematic 
for attorneys operating on limited budgets” because they may be forced out of 
practice if they are required to choose between purchasing insurance and bearing a 
negative stigma). 
 138. For example, in a commentary in opposition to mandatory disclosure, Edward 
Mendrzycki, the former chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers’ 
Professional Liability, identified various features of malpractice policies that could 
lead clients to believe that they could recover sums under an attorney’s professional 
liability policy. See Mendrzycki, supra note 133. 
 139. See id.  
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that they carry insurance at the beginning of the attorney-client 
relationship may not be insured at the time that the actual claim is 
made and reported.140  Other concerns relate to the fact that limits of 
liability, deductibles, insuring agreements, exclusions, and even 
conditions vary widely.141  Because of the complexity of professional 
liability policies, the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers’ 
Professional Liability has opposed the adoption of mandatory 
disclosure rules because the lack of protection potentially misleads 
the client into believing remedies exist to recoup losses.142 
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Texas weighed the arguments 
related to adoption of a mandatory disclosure rule.143  Following a 
recommendation from the Board of Directors of the State Bar of 
Texas, the Supreme Court of Texas concluded that it would maintain 
the status quo and not adopt any form of disclosure rule.144  This 
decision came after a lengthy debate and conflicting 
recommendations.145  First, in 2008, the State Bar of Texas Task Force 
on Insurance Disclosure voted against adoption of an insurance 
disclosure rule.146  Within a year, the Grievance Oversight Committee 
 
 140. For a discussion of the differences between occurrence and claims-made 
policies and other terms of professional liability policies, see Susan Saab Fortney, 
Legal Malpractice Insurance: Surviving the Perfect Storm, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 41, 43–
44 (2004). 
 141. Some argue that “the effort to provide more detailed disclosure addressing 
these finer points [of coverage] may cause even more confusion.” Gallagher, supra 
note 91, at 6. 
 142. Mignone, supra note 113, at 1084.  Many members of the ABA Standing 
Committee on Lawyers’ Professional Liability are affiliated with professional liability 
insurers or law firms that defend legal malpractice cases.  
 143. See generally Terry Tottenham, Radio Nowhere, 33 TEX. B.J. 728 (2010) 
(describing the debate and how the State Bar “worked hard” to engage members in 
considering the recommendation to the Supreme Court of Texas). 
 144. In a letter dated April 14, 2010 to the President of the State Bar of Texas, the 
Supreme Court of Texas reported its decision to not adopt an insurance disclosure 
rule. Court Decides Against Mandatory Professional-Liability Insurance Disclosure, 
TEX. SUP. CT. (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/ 
advisories/Professional_Insurance_Disclosure_041610.htm. 
 145. The State Bar of Texas website contains a great deal of information on the 
State Bar’s consideration of the insurance disclosure issue, including reports from 
various bodies and findings from surveys.  For a Table of Contents and links to 
pertinent documents, see generally Professional Liability Insurance Disclosure—
Table of Contents, ST. B. TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/home.html 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
 146. By a margin of one vote, the State Bar of Texas Task Force on Insurance 
Disclosure recommended against requiring attorneys to inform prospective clients of 
whether or not the attorney carried professional liability insurance. Memorandum 
from David J. Beck, Chair, Task Force on Insurance Disclosure for State Bar of 
Texas Board of Directors (June 11, 2008), available at http://www.texasbar.com 
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(GOC), a body appointed by the Supreme Court of Texas, 
recommended that the Supreme Court of Texas adopt a rule 
requiring that lawyers disclose to their clients the fact that they do not 
carry professional liability insurance.147  The Supreme Court of Texas 
then asked the State Bar Board of Directors to take a position.148  
Before doing so, the Board of Directors conducted a multi-phase 
inquiry and study process that included reports, public hearings, 
written submissions, blog postings, and published commentaries.149 
 
/pliflashdrive/material/3_TaskForce_Report_June08.pdf.  The Task Force’s due 
diligence included surveying lawyers and members of the public.  In the survey of 
lawyers, seventy-seven percent of respondents were against requiring disclosure of 
whether they carried professional liability insurance.  In contrast, in the survey of 
members of the public, seventy percent reported that they believed that lawyers 
should be required to inform a potential client whether they carried professional 
liability insurance. Id.  
 147. The final recommendation of the GOC stated: 
The Committee, having studied the recommendations of the State Bar’s 
Task Force on insurance disclosure, and having reviewed how other states 
have addressed these same issues, and after having studied the cost and 
availability of professional liability insurance in Texas, recommends that the 
State Bar of Texas, at the direction [of] the Texas Supreme Court, 
implement a Professional Liability Insurance Disclosure rule.  The rule, the 
Committee believes, should be made part of the Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct so that any violation of the rule will be handled 
through the grievance process . . . .  
GRIEVANCE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, 
EXCERPT FROM THE GRIEVANCE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE 2009 REPORT TO THE 
SUPREME COURT (2009), available at http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/ 
material/8_Grievance%20Report.pdf [hereinafter GOC REPORT].  The GOC 
provided specific provisions for the proposed disclosure rule, including the 
recommendation that the rule require disclosure at the time a client engages a lawyer 
when the lawyer does not carry at least $100,000 per claim and $300,000 in the 
aggregate.” Id. at 6.  By way of full disclosure, I previously served as the chairperson 
of the GOC.  I also participated in some of the GOC’s discussions of the mandatory 
disclosure rule. 
 148. Letter from Wallace B. Jefferson, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Texas, to Harper Estes, President, Board of Directors, State Bar of Texas and 
Roland Johnson, President Elect, Board of Directors, State Bar of Texas (June 23, 
2009), available at http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/ 
SCt_Letter_062309.pdf. 
 149. Bar leadership designed the study to obtain information from both attorneys 
and members of the bar. Bar directors sought feedback from attorneys by sending 
first class letters to their constituents, through the Texas Bar Blog, email submissions, 
and responses from State Bar Sections, Committees and local bar associations. See 
Executive Summary, ST. B. TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/ 
ExecSummaryFinal.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).  The TEXAS BAR JOURNAL also 
published pro and con commentaries. See generally Chuck Herring & Bill Miller, 
Pro/Con Professional Liability Insurance Disclosure: Should Be Required, 72 TEX. 
B.J. 822 (2009).  
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To obtain the perspectives of consumers of legal services, State Bar 
leadership included the public in hearings and conducted a public 
opinion survey.150  The survey conducted in November 2009 started 
with open-ended questions related to the factors respondents 
believed were important when hiring lawyers.151  In response to these 
questions, respondents did not identify professional liability coverage 
as a factor.152  When asked a specific question about insurance, forty-
nine percent of respondents indicated that a lawyer’s lack of 
insurance would affect their decision to hire the lawyer.153  Eighty-
eight percent reported that they would be less likely to hire a lawyer 
who does not carry professional liability insurance.154  Sixty-four 
percent also believed that lawyers should be required to disclose to 
their clients whether or not they carry professional liability 
insurance.155  A somewhat telling fact regarding the importance of 
lawyers carrying insurance, thirty-six percent of the respondents 
indicated that they would actually pay more in fees in order to ensure 
that their lawyer carries professional liability insurance.156  Although 
most prospective clients might not ask whether a lawyer carries 
insurance, these results suggest that many consumers view insurance 
status as material information.157 
 
 150. For the survey report, see ST. B. TEX., supra note 105. 
 151. The first question was an open-ended one asking, “What are the top five 
things you would want to know about an attorney before you would hire them?” Id.  
The second question asked, “Of those top five you indicated, which is the most 
important to you?” Id. 
 152. Id. at Question 1.  Eleven percent indicated that they had asked if their 
attorneys carried professional liability insurance. Id. at Question 4. 
 153. The question asked, “If a lawyer were to inform you that he or she does not 
carry professional liability insurance, would that information affect whether or not 
you hire them?” Id. at Question 8.  Thirty-six percent answered “no” and fifteen 
percent indicated “Don’t Know/No Response.” Id. 
 154. Id. at Question 9.   
 155. Id. at Question 13.  By comparison sixty-six percent of respondents believed 
that doctors should be required to disclose to their clients whether or not they carry 
professional liability insurance, and fifty-five percent reported that mechanics should 
be required to do so. Id. at Questions 14 and 15. 
 156. Id. at Question 16.  A somewhat higher percentage of respondents (forty-nine 
percent) indicated that they would pay more in fees to ensure that their doctor 
carries professional liability insurance. Id. at Question 17. 
 157. To build on data obtained from the telephone survey and “to gain further 
insight into the public’s knowledge, understanding and opinions [related to] 
professional liability insurance,” the State Bar of Texas retained consultants to 
conduct focus groups in four Texas cities. ST. B. TEX., supra note 149, at 4.  After 
hearing a definition of professional liability insurance, seventy percent of the focus 
group participants thought attorneys should be required to disclose whether they 
carried insurance. See Chris Fick & Greg Liddell, Personal Liability Insurance: 
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Despite strong public support for a disclosure rule and the GOC 
recommendation, the State Bar Board of Directors recommended 
against requiring disclosure, siding with the majority of practitioners 
who opposed mandatory disclosure.158  Practitioner opinions voiced in 
both written submissions and hearing testimony overwhelmingly 
opposed requiring disclosure.159  The email invitation soliciting 
opinions generated 182 letters and comments, with 83% opposed to 
mandatory disclosure, 12% in favor of it, and 5% neutral on the 
matter.160  On the Texas Bar Blog, 92% of comments were opposed to 
disclosure and 8% were in favor of disclosure.161  Of the eight 
responses received from State Bar Sections and Committees, six were 
against requiring disclosure and two were neutral.162  At public 
hearings conducted in seven cities, 125 people gave their opinions, 
with six indicating that they supported a disclosure requirement, 
twelve indicating that they took no position, and 107 opposing a 
disclosure requirement.163 
To learn more about the basis for the opposition to mandatory 
disclosure, I analyzed the hearing testimony as summarized on the 
 
Public Opinion Focus Group Study, HUMAN INTERFACES INC. (Jan. 15, 2010), 
http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/SBOT%20FG%20Report_Final_V3.
pdf.  The researchers report that this percentage went down to sixty-five percent after 
hearing unbiased arguments for and against disclosure. Id. at 10–11.  
 158. State Bar of Texas Board of Directors, Official Minutes, ST. B. TEX. (Jan. 28–
29, 2010), http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Meeting_Agendas_ 
and_Minutes&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFileID=319.  On the 
recommendation in question, thirty-nine directors voted against the recommendation 
and one voted for the recommendation. Id.  If the Supreme Court of Texas 
determined that disclosure should be required, the Board of Directors unanimously 
approved (with one abstaining) recommending that the Supreme Court adopt an 
administrative rule (not a disciplinary rule) that requires each Texas lawyer to 
disclose the existence or non-existence of professional liability insurance on the State 
Bar of Texas website. Id.  With the second recommendation, the Board opted for the 
approach that is considered more “lawyer-friendly” because the requirement is set 
forth in an administrative, court rule rather than a disciplinary rule.  Consumer 
advocates also prefer disclosure directly to clients, rather than on a website. See 
HALT Report, supra note 102. 
 159. For a numerical analysis of the submissions, see ST. B. TEX., supra note 149, at 
2–3. 
 160. Id. at 2. 
 161. Id. (reporting that ten of the sixteen comments in favor of a disclosure rule 
appeared to be from physicians and non-lawyers). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 3.  Sixty-one persons testified at the hearings. Id.  For links to audio 
recordings and hearing reports, see ST. B. TEX., supra note 145.  
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State Bar of Texas website.164  The largest number of lawyers opposed 
the disclosure because there was no evidence of a problem.165  Other 
common complaints were that disclosure would be misleading166 and 
would increase malpractice suits.167  Other concerns related to how a 
disclosure requirement would unfairly impact segments of the bar and 
stigmatize uninsured lawyers.  A number of lawyers also referred to 
the costs of insurance.168  Those few who supported adoption of a 
disclosure rule tended to make public protection arguments.169 
 
 164. See ST. B. TEX., supra note 145.  To categorize the positions, I largely relied 
on the arguments used by the researchers who conducted focus groups with non-
lawyers in Texas. See Mignone, supra note 113, at 1083–87 (discussing the focus 
groups conducted for the State Bar of Texas).  Using codes, I identified the up to two 
arguments made by each person. 
 165. As stated by a solo practitioner in the Public Hearing in San Antonio on 
October 14, 2009, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” San Antonio—Oct. 14, 2009, ST. B. 
TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/PLI_SanAntonio_Hearing_ 
upload.mp3 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
 166. A number of lawyers expressed the concern that disclosure would mislead 
clients.  As stated by a family law practitioner in Houston, “These are claims-made 
policies, not occurrence policies like car insurance.  If disclosure were required, the 
public would be confused and think, ‘If there’s a bad result, I can make a claim.’” 
Houston—Oct. 16, 2009, ST. B. TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/ 
material/PLI_Houston_Hearing_upload.mp3 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
 167.  As stated in testimony at the Houston Hearing, “A disclosure requirement 
would open the floodgates to frivolous litigation.” Id.  Those who claim that requiring 
insurance will “simply put a target on lawyers’ backs” may not fully appreciate the 
hurdles that plaintiffs must overcome in a legal malpractice case.  Experienced 
lawyers who handle legal malpractice cases recognize the numerous challenges in 
winning a legal malpractice case, including expenses associated with retaining expert 
witnesses and establishing causation.  These challenges include the “case within the 
case requirement” in cases involving civil litigation and the “exoneration 
requirement” in cases involving criminal defense work.  For a discussion of the 
elements and burdens in legal malpractice cases, see SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & 
VINCENT JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW:  PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION (2008). 
See also Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interest of the 
Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 491-502 (2008) (using a number of aspects of 
legal malpractice cases to show that lawyers “enjoy” several unique advantages when 
sued for legal malpractice and that it is much harder to prove legal malpractice cases 
compared to medical malpractice cases). 
 168. See, e.g., Lubbock—Oct. 29, 2009, ST. B. TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/ 
pliflashdrive/material/PLI_Lubbock_Hearing_upload.mp3 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).  
It is unclear whether those who mentioned “costs of insurance” knew the actual cost 
of insurance or if they think that any amount is unreasonable.  As noted in the GOC 
report, a non-profit insurer in Texas offers special rates for new lawyers with first 
year polices costing $500 per year for coverage of $100,000 per claim and a $300,000 
limit for claims aggregated. GOC REPORT, supra note 147, at 5.  After four years of 
practice, the premium goes up to $1,750 per year. Id.  Because numerous factors go 
into premium calculation for experienced attorneys, it is difficult to determine an 
average premium for experienced attorneys.  The GOC Report noted that an 
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An examination of the written comments submitted by email, 
letters, and blog postings reveals a similar pattern.  Some opponents 
of disclosure challenged the public protection justification for 
requiring disclosure, asserting that insurance is for the benefit of the 
insured.170  As stated in the letter from the Chair of the Law Practice 
Management Committee, “Mandatory disclosure inverts the intention 
and beneficiary of coverage . . . .  Legal malpractice insurance is not 
for the protection of clients or the public but rather the protection of 
the insured . . . .”171 
In stark contrast to the vast majority of submissions, three former 
presidents of the State Bar of Texas wrote letters supporting the 
adoption of a new rule.172  David J. Beck, former bar president and 
chair of the State Bar of Texas Task Force on Insurance Disclosure, 
explained his support: 
Recognizing that there are persuasive arguments on both sides of 
the issue, the principal reason I decided in favor of disclosure is that 
the issue squarely pits the interests of lawyers on one side against 
the interests of the public on the other.  I firmly believe that we 
 
informal survey of the members of the Task Force on Insurance Disclosure indicated 
that each was paying approximately $4,000 per year. Id. 
 169. One lawyer who handles legal malpractice cases testified in support of a 
mandatory disclosure rule explaining that he approaches the issue “from the 
perspective of what’s best for the client.” Dallas—Oct. 28, 2009, ST. B. TEX., 
http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/PLI_Dallas_Hearing_upload.mp3 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
 170. Although it is true that liability policies protect the insured, they only cover 
claims for damages brought by third parties. See Third-Party Insurance Definition, 
BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/third-
party-insurance.html#ixzz1y8Bk5vcp  (“Liability insurance purchased by an insured 
(the first party) from an insurer (the second party) for protection against the claims 
of another (the third) party. The first party is responsible for its own damages or 
losses whether caused by itself or a third party.”).   
 171. Letter from Philip Farlow, Chair of the Law Practice Mgmt. Comm., to Gib 
Walton, Attorney, Vinson & Elkins LLP (June 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/Sections_CommitteesResponses.pdf.  
The Chair-Elect of the Council of the General Practice, Solo, and Small Firm Section 
warned, “Once the principle that malpractice insurance is for the benefit of the client 
or ‘the public’ and not the insured the next logical implication of that principle is that 
malpractice insurance should be mandatory for protection of the client.” See Letter 
from Wendy Buskop, Chair-Elect, Council of the Gen. Practice, Solo, and Small Firm 
Section to State Bar of Texas (n.d.), available at http://www.texasbar.com/ 
pliflashdrive/material/sections_committeesResponses.pdf.  
 172. See Letter from Broadus A. Spivey, Attorney, to Roland Johnson, President, 
State Bar of Texas (Nov. 20, 2009) (on file with author); Letter From W. Frank 
Newton to Roland Johnson, President, State Bar of Texas (Dec. 9, 2009) (on file with 
author). Mr. Spivey represents plaintiffs in legal malpractice cases and Mr. Newton 
manages a non-profit foundation and previously served as a law school dean. 
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should come down on the side of the public.  Practicing law is a 
privilege and our basic goal must be to serve the public.173 
Another Texas lawyer prefaced his comments by noting that he 
considers law to be a “profession and not merely a business.”174  The 
lawyer described the tension between lawyer and client interests as 
follows: “I have heard the arguments expressed by the opponents to 
disclosure.  I truly feel they simply beg the question and unfortunately 
place the attorneys [sic] well-being over that of the clients.  In my 
mind, that is contrary to our basic obligations.”175 
The opinions expressed in the Texas debate over a mandatory 
disclosure rule reflect lawyers’ attitudes about disclosure and financial 
accountability for misdeeds.  Many lawyers espouse the rhetoric of 
professionalism while placing their own financial interests over those 
of clients and injured persons.  Evidently, they do not agree that 
financial accountability is an important aspect of practicing law as a 
profession. 
CONCLUSION: EMBRACING ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
DISTINGUISHING LAW PRACTICE AS A PROFESSION 
In discussing limited liability and insurance initiatives, this Article 
focuses on the dynamics involved when lawyers have the opportunity 
to make choices related to public protection.  Reviewing the course of 
 
 173. See Letter from David J. Beck, Attorney, Beck Redden & Secrest, to Roland 
K. Johnson, President, State Bar of Texas (Dec. 16, 2009) (on file with author).  A 
director of Public Citizen made a similar observation related to lawyers’ special 
position, in stating: 
Having a law license is an important right.  It also is a privilege granted by 
the State.  Lawyers should be honest and forthright in dealings with clients.  
An uninsured lawyer who injures a client is likely to leave the client without 
any practical remedy.  Texas law requires drivers to have insurance, but 
does not require lawyers to have insurance—even though lawyers have 
great power and great potential to injure clients financially.  This proposed 
rule would cost lawyers nothing.  It does not require that they carry 
insurance.  It simply requires honesty and forthright disclosure of insurance 
status.  Texas consumers are entitled to at least that much information. 
See Letter from Tom “Smitty” Smith, Dir., Pub. Citizen, Texas Office, to Roland K. 
Johnson, President, State Bar of Texas (Dec. 30, 2009) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Public Citizen Letter].   
 174. See Letter from Roger W. Anderson, Attorney, Gillen & Anderson, to State 
Bar of Texas (Oct. 16, 2009) (on file with author). 
 175. Id.   
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events reveals that lawyers have tended to elevate their own self-
interest over consumer interests.176 
The birth and growth of the LLP form illustrates that no organized 
group played a role in articulating the interests and concerns of 
consumers of legal services and other persons injured by lawyer 
malpractice.  The LLP legislation apparently swept through the 
United States under the radar of consumer advocacy groups.  
Because many states do not restrict the LLP structure to 
professionals, allowing a variety of enterprises to organize as LLPs 
benefitted experienced consumers of legal services, such as business 
owners.177  Moreover, sophisticated users of legal services, such as 
corporations, did not need to rely on unlimited liability of general 
partnerships when retaining lawyers.  In engaging counsel, such 
consumers could protect their own interests by requiring their lawyers 
to maintain malpractice insurance as a condition of employment.178  
Therefore, the persons left without protection were inexperienced 
users of legal services who may have assumed that lawyers carry 
insurance.179  Such consumers likely do not know the effect and 
consequences of their lawyers practicing in LLPs.180 
Regardless of legislative action, state supreme courts could have 
taken steps to prohibit or regulate lawyers practicing in LLPs.  Using 
their inherent authority, the courts could have refused to recognize 
the LLP shield or required additional safeguards as a condition of 
 
 176. In a survey conducted by the Utah Bar Association, thirty-two percent of the 
attorney-respondents agreed with the statement, “The public believes that attorneys 
put their own interests ahead of their clients,” and nine percent “strongly agreed” 
with the statement. Utah State Bar, 2001 SURVEY OF MEMBERS, Questionnaire 2, 
Question 51, available at http://www.utahbar.org/documents/2011_SurveyOf 
Attorneys.pdf. 
 177. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 2.03(a)(3) (describing the types of 
business that may organize as LLPs under state laws). 
 178. Corporations have increasingly dictated the terms of engagement in Outside 
Counsel (OC) Guidelines.  These guidelines cover a range of concerns, including 
insurance, billing, and staffing.  For a fascinating analysis of OC Guidelines’ influence 
on the conduct of lawyers, see generally Christopher J. Whelan & Neta Ziv, 
Privatizing Professionalism: Client Control of Lawyers’ Ethics, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2577 (2012). 
 179. In a November 2009 public opinion survey conducted for the State Bar of 
Texas, 87.1% of respondents indicated that they did not ask their attorneys whether 
the attorneys carried professional liability insurance. See ST. B. TEX., supra note 105.  
Approximately 70% of the 500 respondents indicated that they did not know if their 
attorneys carried professional liability insurance. Id. at Question 5. 
 180. According to a survey I conducted of members of the Austin Chamber of 
Commerce in June 1996, 91.27% of the respondents did not understand the effect of 
law firms practicing as LLPs or LLCs. See Fortney, supra note 8, at 752 n.158. 
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allowing firm principals to limit their vicarious liability.  The majority 
of high courts did not use their authority to regulate law practice, but 
simply allowed firm partners to limit their liability and practice as if 
they were members of business organizations, rather than 
professional organizations with special responsibilities.181 
Various considerations may explain the failure of courts to do 
more with respect to client protection.  First, the vast majority of 
judges practiced law before assuming their judicial positions.  These 
judges may have empathized with firm principals’ desire to limit their 
liability.182  Second, in states with judicial elections, judges rely heavily 
on financial and other support from the practicing bar.183  Third, 
individual judges may not have focused on the changing economics of 
law firms and the consequences of eliminating vicarious liability for 
thinly capitalized firms.  Finally, on a more subconscious level, judges 
may make decisions that favor lawyer interests over public interests 
because judges respond to the world as lawyers.184 
A small number of state supreme courts carefully considered the 
consequences of lawyers practicing in LLPs.  For example, the Illinois 
Supreme Court took steps to provide some degree of public 
protection by imposing adequate insurance requirements for limited 
liability firms, determined on a per-lawyer basis.185  By doing so, the 
 
 181. As noted by Professor Wolfram, most courts have not been involved in the 
LLP adoption process in any way and “[i]n only a very few states have the courts 
played a role in implementing their local legislation that is more consistent with 
inherent powers claims.” Wolfram, supra note 8, at 361–62. 
 182. See Barton, supra note 167, at 456 (identifying a number of “conscious 
factors” that might influence judges to favor the interests of the legal profession:  
“[the judges] are all lawyers, many of their friends and colleagues are lawyers, and 
(whether they are elected or appointed) they likely have their job in large part 
because of the efforts of other lawyers”). 
 183. For a critical analysis of judicial selection and cause for concern about 
impartiality, see Judicial Selection in the States, How It Works/Why It Matters, INST. 
FOR ADVANCEMENT AM. LEGAL SYS. (2008), http://iaals.du.edu/images/ 
wygwam/documents/publications/Judicial_Selection_States2008.pdf. 
 “In the last four election cycles, candidates for state high courts have raised nearly 
double the amount raised by candidates in the 1990s.” Id. at 4. 
 184. See Barton, supra note 167, at 456 (using the theory of “new institutionalism” 
to explain how judges share with lawyers a set of norms, thought patterns, and 
behaviors and that these “deeply ingrained biases, thought–processes, and views of 
the world . . . control judicial thinking and outcomes” in a way that is favorable to the 
legal profession). 
 185. Illinois was the last state to adopt a rule allowing lawyers to practice in limited 
liability firms.  The Illinois Supreme Court adopted this rule after a lengthy debate 
and evaluation process in which interested groups submitted position papers. See 
supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
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Illinois court conditioned the elimination of vicarious liability of firm 
partners on their firms carrying insurance at higher levels than the 
$100,000-per-firm amount required in the first LLP legislation.186  In 
this sense, insurance became a trade-off for firm principals who 
demonstrated their financial responsibility in the form of insurance or 
other assets. 
Other than Illinois and a few other states that imposed meaningful 
insurance requirements, client interests appeared to receive little 
attention.  This fact is unsurprising for virtually no critics successfully 
championed the concerns of consumers of legal services and persons 
injured by lawyers’ misdeeds. 
Consumers should not look to the ABA to protect their interests.  
The ABA functions more as a trade group that represents lawyers’ 
interests than as a professional group committed to client protection.  
Although the ABA states that its mission is “[t]o serve equally our 
members, our profession and the public by defending liberty and 
delivering justice as the national representative of the legal 
profession,” the ABA’s goals and objectives do not describe 
consumer protection concerns.  Most revealing is the first goal of the 
ABA, which reads “serve our members.”  When the ABA mission 
statement was proposed in 2008, former ABA president Michael 
Greco asserted that the mission statement should put the “rule of 
law” first.187  In describing his opposition to the proposed amendment, 
he stated: 
The issue is whether the American Bar Association from this day 
forward will define itself as a trade association or as a noble 
profession—whether it’s changing its highest priority from serving 
the people we are bound to serve or serving our own interests . . . .  
The proposed statement will tell the world that the goals lead off 
with serving ourselves.188 
Greco’s recommendation was rejected and the ABA adopted the 
proposed mission statement that puts lawyers first.189 
 
 186. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 187. See House of Delegates Passionately Debates ABA’s Goals, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 
12, 2008, 9:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/house_of_delegates_ 
passionately_debates_abas_goals/. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. (“Our members are the soul of this association.  Our members are 
those who we are bound to serve.” (quoting the incoming chair of the ABA’s 
membership committee defending the proposed mission) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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Within the ABA there are pockets of consumer-minded 
individuals, such as the ABA Standing Committee on Client 
Protection.190  These groups have supported initiatives such as the 
ABA Model Rule that requires lawyers to disclose their lack of 
insurance.191  Despite the diligent efforts of these groups, strong 
sectors within the bar convinced a number of state supreme courts to 
not adopt a mandatory disclosure rule.192  Evidently, decision-makers 
in states that declined to pass mandatory disclosure rules were not 
persuaded that such a rule was necessary to protect consumers or 
those lawyers who act responsibly in carrying insurance.193 
While courts will continue to assume primary responsibility for 
lawyer regulation, lawyers may face legislative action.194  For example, 
proponents of mandatory disclosure have threatened to resurrect a 
bill proposed by a Texas legislator.195  Now that the Supreme Court of 
Texas has declined to adopt a disclosure rule, the proposed legislation 
may garner more support from those who believe that lawyers 
elevated their own interests above the public interest.196 
 
 190. For a description of the charge of the ABA Standing Committee on Client 
Protection, see Who We Are, STANDING COMMITTEES: CLIENT PROTECTION, 
http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=SC105020&new (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2012). 
 191. In 2004, the ABA Standing Committee recommended the Model Rule on 
Insurance Disclosure that the ABA House of Delegates approved by a slim margin. 
See Mills & Petrova, supra note 106, at 1036–37 (chronicling the Committee’s effort). 
 192. For example, in Texas, state bar sections, committees, and local bar 
associations overwhelmingly opposed adoption of a mandatory disclosure rule.  
According to its Executive Summary, the State Bar of Texas received eight responses 
“from State Bar Sections and Committees with six [against a mandatory disclosure 
rule] and two neutral. . . . Likewise, six responses were received from local bar 
associations with five against (in the form of resolutions and polls) and one neutral 
(an informational newsletter article).” ST. B. TEX., supra note 149. 
 193. In professional liability litigation, the burden may fall on the shoulders of 
insured lawyers when plaintiffs do not pursue claims against uninsured lawyers. 
 194. James Fischer, External Control Over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 59, 108 (2006) (suggesting that there may be increased flashpoints between 
legislators and the bar over lawyers’ professional and public duties). 
 195. See, e.g., Public Citizen Letter, supra note 173 (warning that the Texas 
legislature was likely to address the insurance disclosure issue if the Supreme Court 
of Texas did not do so). 
 196. See Herring & Miller, supra note 149, at 822 (noting that the previously 
proposed legislation did not move forward because it appeared as if the court would 
mandate disclosure).  In warning that the “days of self-regulation may be numbered,” 
Professor Fischer explains that self-regulation may become a “victim of lawyer 
success or, as some critics would have it, lawyer excess.” Fischer, supra note 194, at 
109. 
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In the long run, the support for various consumer protection 
initiatives will increase if more lawyers view financial responsibility as 
a defining feature of professional practice.  Currently, there appears 
to be no consensus on the ethical and professional dimensions of 
lawyer accountability.  For example, one distinguished bar leader 
opposed the adoption of a disciplinary rule that required lawyers to 
disclose their insurance status, asserting that neither the purchase of 
insurance nor the failure to purchase insurance implicates “ethical 
tenets.”197  Beyond the ethics rules that represent minimum standards 
to avoid professional discipline, professionalism creeds often refer 
generally to civility and public service, with limited attention to client 
protection concerns.198 
Law school educators and bar leaders should challenge lawyers to 
examine the role that client protection plays in professional practice.  
Starting in law school, professors should devote more attention to 
legal malpractice and the importance of lawyers being accountable 
for their acts and omissions.199  In regulating lawyers, courts should 
hold them to strict accountability for the performance and observance 
of their professional duties.200  Finally, those who espouse the status of 
law as a profession should recognize financial responsibility as a 
professional virtue and promote it as such.201 
 
 197. See Mendrzycki, supra note 133, at 37.  Mr. Mendrzycki chaired the ABA 
Standing Committee on Lawyer’s Professional Liability. 
 198. See, e.g., The Supreme Court of Ohio Commission on Professionalism, 
Professionalism CLE Guidelines, adopted June 14, 2002, 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/CP/guidelines.pdf (surveying various 
definitions of professionalism). 
 199. See Ramos, supra note 78, at 2618–23 (suggesting that the failure to cover 
legal malpractice in law school amounts to a form of malpractice by law school 
professors).  At the Fordham-Touro Symposium, The Law: Business or Profession?, I 
circulated a short questionnaire asking professors about coverage in their 
professional responsibility classes.  In the small sample, only two professors answered 
the following question in the affirmative, “In your classes, do you discuss whether 
lawyers have a professional responsibility to cover damages arising from their acts or 
omissions?”  Nine reported that they did not cover the topic, with one professor 
noting that s/he does not “directly” cover the topic and that it “seems pretty 
obvious.”  Another indicated that s/he “sometimes” discusses the issues. See Survey 
from Fordham-Touro Symposium, The Law: Business or Profession? (Apr. 23–24, 
2012) (on file with author). 
 200. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 91, at 5 (quoting court opinions that 
underscored responsibilities that lawyer-fiduciaries owe clients). 
 201. For an interdisciplinary analysis of the common characteristics of 
professionals, see Sande L. Buhai, Profession: A Definition, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
241 (2012); Debra Lyn Bassett, Redefining the “Public” Profession, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 
721, 771 (2005). 
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If we fail to protect those who rely on us, we fail to fulfill our 
obligations as a protected profession.  As former ABA president 
Michael Greco suggested, the choice is ours.202  Will lawyers function 
as a trade group protecting their own personal interests over public 
interests, or will lawyers embrace accountability as a defining 
attribute of law as a profession?  To answer this question, we need 
not take a position that law is a business or profession.203  Rather, law 
is a business of relationships in which lawyers’ conduct should be 
guided by professional ideals and values.  What distinguishes the 
practice of law from other business pursuits is how we treat, and 
remain accountable, to those who trust us. 
 
 
 202. See House of Delegates Passionately Debates ABA’s Goals, supra note 187. 
 203. See Christine Parker, Law Firms Incorporated: How Incorporation Could and 
Should Make Firms More Ethically Responsible, 23 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 347, 380 
(2004) (suggesting that there is no justification for drawing stark distinctions between 
law as a business and profession). 
